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The revitalization of Baltimore's Inner Harbor and waterfront is internationally recognized as a planning and 
urban design model. This successful story started in the late 1950s with the Charles Center redevelopment plan 
for the core of the Central Business Distric and its positive effects on the city's economy. In the first of a two-
part article, Vicente del Rio writes about this early plan and its role in Baltimore's efforts towards a sustainable 
revitalization. Next FOCUS will feature his account of the plan for the Inner Harbor and beyond.
From Downtown to the Inner Harbor: 
Baltimore's Sustainable Revitalization 
Part 1: The Charles Center Plan
Vicente del Rio
PhD; Professor, City and Regional 
Planning Department, Cal Poly.
I have a long-standing fascination for Baltimore’s efforts in revitalizating its downtown and, particularly, the waterfront. 
In 1984 I had the chance to spend some time there, dividing 
my attention between research and practice, and I was in 
awe from the moment I arrived.1 As an urban design scholar 
and practitioner, Baltimore was, and still is, one of the most 
fascinating international examples of revitalization, place 
making, waterfront redevelopment, and re-imaging. From 
a run-down, decaying, and almost hopeless case of urban 
neglect, economic exhaustion, and suburbanization, the city 
raised from its ashes, rebuilt, and became a great place to live, 
shop, recreate, and visit. Baltimore’s success in revitalizing its 
Inner Harbor is heralded as an international model of success, 
and is noted in all professional publications. Despite the social 
and economic problems and downturns hitting Baltimore over 
the years, it is one of the most attractive, dynamic, and fun 
metropolitan cities in the US. 
Notwithstanding Baltimore’s success with its downtown 
and Inner Harbor, our field has not seen any comprehensive 
publication on the planning process behind this success. 
That realization came as a surprise to me when, in 2008, I 
was invited to contribute to a book on the revitalization of 
port areas for the City of Rio de Janeiro. At that time Rio was 
immersed in strategic planning for the 2014 World Cup and 
the 2016 Olympic Games, and downtown projects were 
prioritized including the redevelopment of a long stretch of 
the city’s historic port. Since leaving Baltimore in 1985 I visited 
a couple of times and remained an interested observer, so I 
gladly plunged into the article by updating my old records and 
studies, reviewing the literature, and consulting with personal 
connections there. My efforts led to a book chapter providing 
a panoramic view of Baltimore’s fifty years of planning and 
urban design efforts leading to the Inner Harbor success.2 
However, having a publication in Portuguese limits its reach 
and, encouraged by several colleagues, I decided to adapt it 
for FOCUS. 
My essay tells the story of Baltimore’s efforts towards reinvent-
ing its downtown and revitalizing its Inner Harbor and water-
front, and the several components of a vision that has been 
consistent and sustainable enough to successfully incorporate 
political interests, market forces, and community needs. But I 
must warn the readers that this is not data-driven academic 
work but a professional-oriented story from my personal per-
spective. And because my account of Baltimore’s fifty-plus 
years of downtown revitalization efforts and successful proj-
ects is long, it will appear in FOCUS in two parts. In the cur-
rent issue, the first part covers the initial steps in the late 1950s 
with the Charles Center Renewal Plan. The second part, to ap-
pear in FOCUS next year, will cover the revitalization of the In-
ner Harbor and beyond. Hopefully, I will be able to show how 
Baltimore managed to plan for a short and long-term strategy, 
reverse an escalating number of problems affecting the down-
town, and keep afloat as a feasible city. There are some impor-
tant lessons in this story for planners and urban designers.
1 As a Senior Visiting Scholar with the Johns Hopkin's Center for 
Metropolitan Research, and as a Visiting Urban Designer with the 
City of Baltimore's Housing and Urban Renewal Department, from 
August to December 1984.
2 Organized for the City of Rio de Janeiro's Mayor office. See 
"Baltimore, Inner Harbor" in V. Andreatta (ed.) Porto Maravilha - Rio 
de Janeiro + Seis Casos de Sucesso de Revitalização Portuaria. Rio de 
Janeiro: Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro / Casa da Palavra, 2010, pp. 22-61
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Sustainable Revitalization
In revitalizing cities and urban districts, planning and urban 
design should be guided by a sustainable development 
paradigm that is best represented, as suggested by Godschalk 
(2004), by a pyramid with ecology, economy, and equity at the 
base and livability at the top (Figure 1). On the one hand, this 
paradigm recognizes that high-quality design interventions 
are fundamental for sustainability. On the other hand, because 
of declining public investment capabilities and the increasingly 
globalized market space, cities are looking for flexible strategic 
planning models that include public-private partnerships and 
participatory practices as competitive advantages.
Strategic sustainable planning must be a way to think and 
conceive urbanism, reflecting in the city as a whole and in its 
various parts. As a decision-making process, it must constantly 
be assessed by stakeholders, particularly the communities 
directly impacted by the decisions (Marshall, 2001). Each 
positive result contributes to the whole, feeding a sustainable 
process and attracting new investments, residents, and 
consumers that, in turn, generate additional projects and so 
on. Sustainable revitalization of urban cores, specifically of 
ports and waterfronts, has become archetypical of the post-
industrial city, enabling cities to participate in a competitive 
global market where national and local identities, and quality 
of life are essential elements (del Rio, 1991; Shaw, 2001; Stevens, 
2009). An important component of this complex sustainable 
planning process is place making, place marketing, and the 
constant monitoring of place quality (Kotler et al., 1993).
Baltimore’s Charles Center and Inner Harbor plans had the 
National League of Cities Baltimore appoint Baltimore as the 
most successful city in economic development (in Kotler, 
Haider & Rein, 1993: 62). As with any competitive product at 
the global level, the process of revitalizing central areas and 
obsolete ports adopted a model that is, at the same time, 
adaptable for both tourist and local consumption (Breen & 
Rigby, 1993, 1996; Marshall, 2001; Stevens, 2009). Among 
experiences of waterfront intervention and revitalization 
in post-industrial cities, Baltimore’s Inner Harbor is a model 
difficult to avoid (Busquets, 1995). According to the American 
Institute of Architects (AIA), Baltimore’s Inner Harbor is “one 
of the supreme achievements of large-scale urban design 
and development in U.S. history” (Millspaugh, 2003). By 2000, 
the Charles Center-Inner Harbor redevelopment plans had 
received 45 national or international awards and the renowned 
Frommer’s guide consistently picks Baltimore as one of the top 
ten cities to visit in the United States.
The success of the Inner Harbor’s initiative, its positive effects 
on the larger city, and its sustainability over time has made it 
an international point of reference: a flexible initial plan, open 
to community and private sector participation, a determined 
city government and willing business partners, a smart 
management structure, and quality urban planning led to the 
place’s redevelopment and appreciation. 
The Historical Context
Following World War II, not unlike most US cities, Baltimore 
started feeling the impacts of suburban development. Firstly, 
the federal government was incentivizing new housing for 
veterans returning from the war through cheap mortgages. 
Secondly, the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 destined large 
resources to highway construction to support the growth of 
the automobile industry. In the case of Baltimore, estimates 
indicate that most of the 30,000 returning veterans settled in 
new suburban tract housing Olson (1997). However, although 
Baltimore’s industrial base had expanded significantly during 
the war efforts, it retracted in the post-war period and, by the 
late 1940s, Baltimore’s industry had shrunk by 45,000 jobs 
(Olson, 1997). Labour cuts, plant closings, and technological 
reorganizations continued to hit Baltimore through the 1980s 
(Merrifield, 2002). Between 1950 and 1960 the city lost 18,000 
manufacturing jobs, and of the 1,738 manufacturing firms that 
existed in the 1950s only 696 were left in 1984 (Levine, 1987; 
Merrifield, 2002)
The pursuit of the American Dream of owning a home in 
suburbia, the ease of moving around on the new highways, 
and the deterioration of Baltimore’s industrial and economic 
base, pushed the middle and upper class families out of the 
city. With them went the shops, businesses, schools, hospitals, 
and public institutions. Between 1950 and 1960 Baltimore’s 
suburban population jumped from 270,000 to 492,000 (Warren 
& McCarthy, 2002). Meanwhile, poorer populations with lower 
mobility —mostly African-Americans that had unsteady or 
lower paid jobs— stayed behind in the inner city with little or 
no economic opportunities. While white families moved out, 
real estate prices dropped significantly, and buildings became 
rapidly susceptible to deterioration, facilitating poorer families 
to move into older neighborhoods. The flight of families 
and businesses to the suburbs together with the changing 
economy led to a precipitous drop in Baltimore’s real estate 
prices and tax base, leading to a spiralling effect of depression. 
Livability
Economy
Equity Ecology
Figure 1: The sustainability pyramid 
(based on Godschalk, 2004).
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While in the 1960s an average Baltimore resident was paying 
twice the property tax than a suburbanite, the latter paid twice 
as much income tax (Olson, 1997). This phenomenon, known 
as “white flight”, had profound negative impacts on all large 
cities in the US. 
Although unsuccessful, Baltimore’s late 1940s attempt to deal 
with its inner-city slums through zoning and code enforcement 
became a model to many US cities (Hoffman, 2008). By the 
1950s the effects of the “white-flight” on Baltimore’s city 
core were huge: hundreds of lots had been vacant for over 
fifteen years, 5,000 thousand buildings were either vacant 
or deteriorated, 25,000 substandard residential units had 
to be demolished, and poverty driven racial problems were 
escalating since nine out of ten evicted residents were African-
American (Olson, 1997). In Baltimore alone, between 1951 and 
1964, highway construction, urban renewal and other public 
programs resulted in the displacement of 10,000 families of 
which 90 percent were black (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989). By 
the 1960s Baltimore was the leading US city in tearing down 
old and poorly maintained buildings, causing violent traumas 
to the evicted families and contributing significantly to the 
escalating racial problems that culminated in the huge riots 
and burning that shook the city in 1968.
By the 1950s the Inner Harbor, Baltimore’s main port area, 
was also facing untenable conditions. Firstly, the old harbor’s 
morphology, the encroaching city, and the obsolescence of 
its facilities were severe obstacles to proper cargo handling 
and storage, new terminals, and modern port operations 
that increasingly relied on containerization. Secondly, the 
antiquated street grid limited accessibility to the port seriously 
impacting circulation and the movement of large trucks. 
Finally, because of the Inner Harbor’s size and shallow waters –
both pluses for vessels in the past– Baltimore’s port was unable 
to attract modern and large ships. 
Depopulation, deindustrialization, and the inability to solve 
the physical limitations of its port were lethal blows to 
Baltimore’s harbor (Wrenn, 1983). By the late 1950s, thousands 
of jobs had ceased to exist, and the maritime industry and 
most commercial activities had abandoned the Inner Harbor. 
Hundreds of warehouses and buildings were vacant, and the 
desert streets were taken by filth and wrecked cars. Baltimore 
became known as a city with a great past, but no future and 
the deterioration of its downtown became the major cause of 
the inferiority complex shared by Baltimoreans (Millspaugh, 
2003; Pike, 2009).
The Seed for Revitalization: The Charles Center Plan 
In 1954, Baltimore’s business community formed two im-
portant groups that would be immensily instrumental in the 
long downtown revitalization process that was about to start: 
the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) and the Commit-
tee for Downtown. Sharing the same economic goals, both 
organizations were preoccupied with the decaying down-
town and agreed on the need for a plan to reverse it. Among 
these city champions was James Rouse, a local visionary 
developer whose company was about to become a major 
player in Boston’s and then Baltimore’s revitalization efforts.3 
Although at that time Baltimore was facing strong competition 
from the suburbs and commercial sales in the city had dropped 
dramatically, the high office occupancy rate of 97% suggested 
a strong potential for downtown redevelopment (Lang, 2005).
GBC’s planning council hired architect and planner David Wal-
lace, former chief of planning for Philadelphia’s redevelopment 
authority, to develop a plan for the Central Business District.4 
Wallace would develop a strategic vision and quickly realized 
that planning for downtown’s 125 hectares would take so long 
that “the patient could die on the operating table while the 
diagnosis was being determined” and decided to focus on a 
short-term plan for a smaller area with the potential for imme-
diate impact (Millspaugh 2003: 37; Wallace, 2004). Presented 
in 1957 and adopted by the City, the Charles Center Plan was 
the first focusing on the renewal of an American city core and 
one of the most influential in the US (Whyte, 1988; Lang, 2005) 
(Figure 2). It was the first plan to propose public-private part-
nerships, estimating a total of $140 million (in 1957 dollars) in 
public investments (Bonnel, 1979; Millspaugh, 2003). A more 
comprehensive, policy-oriented vision plan for the whole CBD 
was only finished and approved in 1959, and included, for in-
stance, the expansion of the University of Maryland downtown 
campus and a new Central Retail Area, and the Inner Harbor as 
a future redevelopment phase (Wallace, 2004). Regarding place 
making, Kotler, Haider & Rein (1993: 333-334) point to the im-
portance of Baltimore having a “comprehensive plan as well as 
a one or two key ideas that captured the public’s imagination”.
Implementation of the Charles Center Plan started with the 
approval of the plan and its 40-year urban development controls. 
Rezoning the area and establishing it as an urban renewal 
district followed shortly, opening the way for the city to use 
eminent domain and to seek federal redevelopment grants. Plan 
3 James Rouse’s biography is an interesting chapter on its own. An 
incredibly active entrepeneur and a major player in Baltimore's 
renaissance, Rouse believed that the market economy should have 
a social conscience, a value that marked all his work life (Bloom, 
2004; Olsen, 2004). He was a constant adviser to the US government 
on urban and housing policy, and his company was responsible 
for pioneering projects such as Columbia New Town in Maryland, 
planned with racially integrated neighborhoods. Planning shopping 
malls as gathering centers for the community in a context that 
welcomed social and ethnic minorities, the Rouse Company invented 
the festival mall concept that mixes retail, food and recreation, such 
in Boston and Baltimore (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1991). James Rouse was 
awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1995.
4 David Wallace was one of the most prolific and influential urban 
designers and planners in the US, having received the AICP 2009 
National Planning Pioneer Award. In the early 1960s he formed a 
successful partnership with Ian McHarg, William Roberts, and Thomas 
Todd (WMRT). In his professional memoir he discusses his long 
involvement with Baltimore, including the Charles Center and Inner 
Harbor plans (Wallace, 2004). 
■  FOCUS  13 64  ■ Essays
implementation was handed over to a specially formed quasi-
public non-profit entity, the Charles Center Management Office 
The CCMO was the first of entity of its kind in the US and, acted 
outside the city’s bureaucracy it made implementation easier, 
more agile and flexible, proving fundamental for Charles 
Center’s success. Later, the City would expand the CCMO's 
responsibility to include the Inner Harbor area, transforming 
it into the Charles Center / Inner Harbor Incorporate (CC-IH). 
At its start, the CCMO had to deal with hundreds of parcel 
acquisitions and assemblages, the relocation of 850 businesses 
(who were moved back after the project was over), and 
the continuous negotiations with dozens of city, state, and 
federal agencies during planning, design, construction, and 
maintenance phases (del Rio, 1985; Lang, 2005). Together with 
the work of the CCMO, former president Martin Millspaugh 
(2003) highlights the importance of GBC and the Committee 
for Downtown’s work in organizing an enormous network of 
contacts and efforts focused on carrying out the plan. 
The Charles Center Plan covered a 22-acre (8.8 hectares) area 
which redevelopment would leverage the revitalization of the 
entire downtown (Millspaugh, 1964; Wallace, 2004). Departing 
from the urban renewal model of the time, the plan resulted 
from a wider comprehensive planning effort and its was more 
careful with pre-existences, not imposing a clean slate, fitting 
into the street grid and preserving four historic buildings 
(Brambilla & Longo, 1979; Wallace, 2004; Lang, 2005). The plan 
was praised by the general and professional media, even by 
Figure 2: Charles Center original model superimposed on an 
aerial photo. The Inner Harbor can be seen on the top of the 
photo. (original photos by M. Warren; from a 1958 booklet 
from the Greater Baltimore Committee, 1958)
Figure 3: Major elements of the Charles Center Plan. 
critics such as Jane Jacobs who called it “a new heart for the 
downtown” in a 1958 article (Wallace, 2004: 18). In a letter to 
James Rouse and the city, Jacobs noted that she liked the plazas 
and the attention given to pedestrians, congratulating the city 
for the plan being “less of a ‘project’ than an integral, continuous 
part of the downtown” (Warren & McCarthy, 2002: 36).
The plan included three superblocks with eight office towers 
and two through-streets running East-West (Figure 3). The 
north superblock included Center Plaza —Charles Center ma-
jor open space– several office buildings, ground-level retail and 
eateries, and the Baltimore Gas & Electric Company and Fidel-
ity historic buildings and a small corner plaza at the tip of the 
block. In this superblock’s southeast corner site, One Charles 
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
North Superblock
1  Residential towers
2  Baltimore Gas & Electric
3  Fidelity Building
4  One Charles Center
5 Central Plaza
Central Superblock
6  Omni Hotel
7  Lord Baltimore Hotel
8  Hamburgers Department Store
9  Baltimore & Ohio Building
South Superblock
10  Hopkins Plaza
11  Morris Mechanic Theatre
12  Federal Building
Outside the plan
13  Civic Center
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Center, the plan’s first new office building, would be inaugu-
rated in 1962. Facing one of the east-west streets, the Center 
Plaza featured an oval-shaped space defined by landscaping, 
seating, and a double line of small ornamental trees (Figure 4). 
The plaza would become popular for public events such as the 
flea market, and its location and size “made it appropriate for 
big events such as the Baltimore City Fair, a popular event that 
drew thousands in celebration of Baltimore’s neighborhoods” 
(Warren & McCarthy, 2002: 38). When inaugurated in 1970, the 
city fair attracted more than 200,000 people to Central Park 
and continued doing so until moved to the Inner Harbor.
The smaller, central block included an Omni hotel (today a Sher-
aton), two small commercial buildings, and the Lord Baltimore 
Hotel (today a Radisson) and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
historical buildings. Bridging over the other east-west street, 
a three-stories department store connected north and central 
blocks at their eastern-most corners. The south superblock, de-
signed around Hopkins Plaza and its fountain, included three 
private office buildings and was anchored by a theatre —the 
plan’s only cultural facility—and the 460,000 square-feet Fed-
eral Building. Keeping the federal administration services  —in-
cluding the court house and immigration services—from build-
ing their new consolidated facilities in the suburbs was a major 
victory for local planners and politicians, and fundamental for 
the Charles Center Plan (Wallace, 2004; 36-37). According to 
Warren & McCarthy (2002) note that, for many years, Hopkins 
Plaza’s amphitheatre ambience surrounded by the theatre, the 
raised platform of surrounding buildings, and the pedestrian 
bridges made it popular for outdoor concerts. In the original 
plan, under the south superblock, an underground transporta-
tion terminal would allow passengers to transfer to city buses.
Although most of the success of both Charles Center’s plazas 
was certainly due to the lack of parks and open spaces in the 
downtown, the spaces and the connections between them 
and the buildings in the three superblocks were comfortable 
and attractive for pedestrians and revealed nice vistas. Finally, 
Charles Center’s original plan included two major modernistic 
features to help link the three superblocks that reflected the 
planners’ modernistic inspiration: a consolidated underground 
parking structure for 4,000 cars and a series of pedestrian 
bridges, as the planners wanted to take advantage of the site’s 
68-foot drop. The idea for a single underground garage across 
all Charles Center properties was dropped early because of the 
numerous ownership and management problems to be dealt 
with. Instead, each site would pursue its underground parking 
solution.
A system of pedestrian bridges, nicknamed “skyway”, integrat-
ed with open spaces and promenades, was to make the pe-
destrian experience comfortable and separate from vehicular 
traffic (see Figures 3 & 4). This system was like a spine linking 
the middle of superblocks north to south and also meant to 
help animate the second floors of buildings, particularly when 
dedicated to retail. Starting at the Center Plaza, the pedestrian 
bridge linked to the second floors of the Omni and Lord Balti-
more hotels in the mid-superblock, and then to the Morris Me-
chanic Theatre and the Hopkins Plaza in the south superblock. 
The south superblock was also bridged to the Civic Center on 
the west and, in the following phase, to the block to the south 
and beyond, eventually, the Inner Harbor.
Implementation and Changes to the Original Plan
In 1999, forty years after adoption and when its special rede-
velopment controls expired, we can consider that the Charles 
Center Plan was successful in reaching its goals. David Wallace, 
Charles Center’s chief urban planner, notes that “from an eco-
nomic and fiscal point of view... it has been an outstanding suc-
cess... turning the CBD from an urban disaster into a national 
model” (Wallace, 2004: 32). Above all, Charles Center was as a 
fundamental catalyst for the wider CBD plan and helped direct 
revitalization towards the Inner Harbor. 
The early formation of the CCMO (and its later expansion to 
incorporate the Inner Harbor) with its effective pro-active work 
was, without a doubt, fundamental for plan implementation 
and respect for its vision, while pursuing public-private 
partnerships and responding to market fluctuations. A 
1989 study included Baltimore as one of the ten most 
entrepreneurial and best manages cities in the US (Kotler, 
Haider & Rein, 1993: 328). For instance, feasibility and market 
studies led to three early changes to the original plan. Firstly, 
the concept for a single consolidated underground garage 
across the three superblocks was dropped out for each site 
having is own solution. Secondly, the idea of an underground 
transportation terminal in the south superblock was given 
up but the Baltimore’s 1965 Area Mass Transportation Plan 
Figure 4: The Center Plaza in the north superblock from the 
pilotis area under One Charles Center. The "skywalk" system 
starts here and can be seen in this photo. In the background, the 
old Bromo-Seltzer Tower. (photo by the author, 1985)
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replaced it with a subway station. The subway line and station 
serving Charles Center became operational in the early 1980s. 
The third early major change to the plan affected the 
top portion of the north superblock that had its land-use 
converted from office to residential and a proposed mid-rise 
parking structure stricken out. According to Wallace (2004), 
the expansion of office uses in the CBD suggested the need 
for upper-income apartments. The resulting two residential 
towers with 400 apartments were offered, instead, to lower-
middle income families, the most evident demand at the time. 
However, the towers did not do well and, by the 1990s, were 
refurbished into upscale apartments plus a small shopping 
center at the ground floor, responding to the growing demands 
of downtown’s residential market (see number 3 in Figure 3). 
All architectural projects in Charles Center had to comply 
with the plan’s specifics and be submitted to an architectural 
review board created by the City and the CCMO (Wallace, 2004). 
The board created site-specific design guidelines that were 
included in requests for proposals as conditions of sale to 
guarantee “how each separate buildings was to fit into the place 
as a whole and connect to its surroundings” (Wallace, 2004: 
37). The same author notes that Baltimore’s practice became 
a model for urban renewal projects funded by the federal 
government. In 1959, Charles Center’s architectural review 
board developed the guidelines for and supervised one of the 
most important strategic decisions: a national competition 
to choose a development proposal for the plan’s first office 
building at a prominent corner site in the north superblock. 
The competition for One Charles center was an effective 
marketing strategy in attracting the attention of the national 
media towards Baltimore’s redevelopment efforts and its 
commitment to modernity through design. Presented by a 
developer from Chicago, the winning project proposal was 
designed by famous modernist architect Mies Van der Rohe. 
Inaugurated in 1962, One Charles Center was Mies’s last 
project before his death and it was typical of his well-known 
International Style: a 23-story steel and dark glass tower on 
columns, with great transparency on the ground floor and 
dedicating most of it for a public plaza (Figure 5). The strategy 
helped to raise the private investors’ confidence in the success 
of the city’s redevelopment efforts. So much so that the 
developer who came second in the competition with a project 
by Marcel Breuer (another top modernist architect) assembled 
a site across the street from One Charles Center and had an 
office tower built first (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989; Wallace, 2004). 
Fortunately, local demand for office use was strong enough, 
and both were leased quickly, generating an important 
demonstration effect.
By 1962, based on the recently approved master plan for the 
CBD --also developed by Wallace and his group-- the City built a 
Civic Center --now named 1st. Mariner Arena-- and an attached 
parking structure with the hopes of attracting the public to 
downtown events (see map in Figure 3). This was an important 
Figure 5: One Charles Center designed by Mies Van der Rohe, and 
the Hamburgers department store spanning over Fayette Street 
(demolished in the late 1980s). (photo by the author, 1985)
addition to the momentum created by Charles Center and 
the revitalization of the CBD. Covering an entire 6-acre block 
west of Charles Center’s south superblock and linked to it by 
a pedestrian bridge, the Civic Center was designed by Pietro 
Belluschi, another famous modernist architect at the time, for 
14,000 sitting spectators. Over the years it hosted numerous 
events such as basketball games, circus, monster trucks 
shows, and concerts by bands such as the Beatles, Cream Led 
Zeppelin, Grateful Dead, Jethro Tull, Bruce Springsteen, and 
Beyonce. Although over the years the building went through 
two major renovations, it has been a continuous success and 
a money-maker. However, by 2014 the City was entertaining 
proposals from private developers to redevelop the block 
into a new, modern facility topped by a residential tower with 
retail at street level. Located at walking distance from plenty 
of parking, subway stations, and the Inner Harbor, this is a 
strategic location and its redevelopment potential further, 
demonstrates Baltimore’s CBD positive dynamics.
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By 1963, in addition to Mies’s office building, Charles Center 
featured two new office buildings while six were in the 
pipeline. By 1967, the south superblock had received two 
major projects: the Federal Office Building and the 1,600-
seat Morris Mechanic Theater, the plan’s only cultural facility. 
Anchoring the Hopkins Plaza and directly connected to the 
skywalk system, the theater was built and named after a 
local entrepreneur who had other such venues in Baltimore. 
According to Wallace (2004: 35), originally Morris Mechanic 
wanted Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier, or Philip Johnson 
to design his building, but settled for brutalist architect John 
Johansen whose “multi-use complex’s layer-cake of public 
parking underground, retail on the first and theatre on the 
second level, with different ownerships on each, was an 
innovative legal as well as architectural creation” (Figure 6). 
Unfortunately, the building’s architecture was never popular, 
and the ground level retail was never strong enough, perhaps 
due to the lack of residential use in the immediate vicinity be-
sides the pull factor from the Inner Harbor. The Morris Mechanic 
Theater remained Baltimore’s main venue for major plays and 
Broadway acts until the early 1990s when its physical limita-
tions started preventing larger contemporary acts. The theatre 
closed in 2004, but its underground parking garage continued 
to operate until the building was torn down in 2015 after local 
preservationists failed in their attempt to have it granted land-
mark status. In 2016 the city approved a project for the site that 
included two towers of 33 and 19 stories with 450 apartments, 
restaurants and retail over five stories of underground parking 
-taking advantage of the subway station in that location and 
responding to the increasing demand for dowtown living.
After their initial success, neither of Charles Center’s two 
main plazas were able to retain the dynamism originally en-
visioned by the planned, no doubt because of being sur-
rounded mostly by offices and of the stronger pull of the 
revitalized Inner Harbor and its parks. Center Plaza in the 
north superblock, never recovered from losing its sever-
al seasonal public events to the Inner Harbor, and its arid 
modernistic design became disfavored by the community. 
It was renovated in 2007 and it now features extensive green-
scaping, a water feature with a pool, movable seating, and night-
lighting effects (Figure 7). In the south-superblock, Hopkins 
Plaza had a similar fate due to the always weak retail around it 
and the closing of the Mechanic Theatre (Figure 8). The Cultural 
Landscape Foundation (n.d.) notes that “the introverted nature 
of the plan was a built-in handicap and prevented the lively, 
populous atmosphere envisioned by planners.” As major flaws, 
they point to the placement of the two major plazas inside the 
superblocks, the excessive hardscaping, the fixed seating, the 
separate building ownership, and the fact that several of the of-
fice buildings had their own subsidized cafeterias discouraging 
workers to lunch in the plazas.  
The skywalk—the extensive system of pedestrian bridges 
connecting the superblocks to the Inner Harbor—started to 
Figure 6: Getting to the south superblock from the "skywalk": 
the Morris Mechanic Theatre on the left, Hopkins Plaza, and the 
Federal Building in the background. (photo by the author, 1986)
Figure 7: The new design for Center Plaza includes four big lawns 
and smaller planters, plenty of trees and seating, and a water 
feature on its west edge. (photo from www.mahanrykiel.com)
Figure 8: The Hopkins Plaza in the south superblock in 2002 receiving 
minor maintenance work, showing the Federal Building and an 
access to underground parking. (photo by the author, 2002)
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be dismantled in the late 1980s and none remains (Figure 8). 
Time showed that people prefer to walk at street level, and the 
prospect for a strong retail component on second floors never 
happened (Whyte, 1988; Lang, 2005). Planner David Wallace 
recognized this problem and noted that some of the skywalks 
blocked views from the street into the plazas and they were 
“circuitous and hard to find” (Wallace, 2004: 33). 
By 1998, the plan’s retail building that spanned over a street 
connecting the mid and north superblocks was torn down 
after the original department store occupying it closed and its 
“tunnel like” effect was recognized as too unpopular (Powell, 
2011). Currently, the resulting north corner parcel has a one-
story retail building with a roof-top plaza connected to One 
Charles Center --the designed by Mies Van der Rohe building. 
In the south corner parcel, a new three-story building holds 
the Johns Hopkins University’s business school, whose MBAs, 
part-time, and weekend courses generate significant activity.
Figure 8: Traversing the center superblock, the skywalk (now 
demolished) along the Lord Baltimore (left) and Omni (right) hotels, 
before getting to the south superblock by the theatre (left) and the 
Federal Building (background). (photo by the author, 1986)
Figure 9: The Charles Center 
area now; compare map and 
legend to those in Figure 3. 
(Aerial photo from Google Earth)
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As noted by Lang (2005), although Charles Center adapted 
to specific demands from clients, to the evolving property 
market, and got considerably denser than the original plan, 
it retained most of its qualities over the years. However, 
although the Charles Center Plan had the right ingredients for 
what, at the time, was thought to lead to a successful place, 
its implementation revealed many of the shortcomings of 
modernism that, in this case, can be grouped into three types: 
land use, management, and design. 
Firstly and above all, the lack of a live-in population impacted 
the plan by not making its spaces lived in and dynamic 
enough. The weight towards office and commercial uses in the 
original plan not only reflected the trend of the time towards 
implementing strick-line CBDs in central cities, but also the 
only market demand that still existed in downtown Baltimore 
in the mid-1950s as noted above. The plan even innovated, if 
compared to others of that era, by including two residential 
towers in the north superblock. However, all the other buildings 
in Charles Center and its surroundings remained exclusively 
non-residential until the late 1980s when the revitalization of 
the Inner Harbor started to ripple back to the downtown. The 
mixed-use project replacing the Mechanic Theatre and the 
proposed to redevelopment the old Civic Center block should 
generate almost 1,000 new apartments and increase the round-
the-clock usage of Charles Center. Another land-use problem 
derived from the number of single-company office buildings 
with their own cafeterias that discouraged employees to eat 
outside and help in the dynamics of the plazas.
Regarding management, problems seem to have happened at 
two levels. The first, higher level of problems was caused by the 
lack of a tighter and more comprehensive planning process 
that could consider the negativities that the success of each 
new plan or initiative could cause on the previous. Although 
it was Charles Center’s success that leveraged the Baltimore’s 
efforts throughout the CBD and the redevelopment of the 
Inner Harbor, once the waterfront was recuperated it became 
too much of a “seductive competitor” (Wallace, 2004: 32). The 
second level of management problems occurred, as pointed 
out by The Cultural Landscape Foundation (n.d.), because 
the city government did not retain ownership of the system 
of open spaces and exterior infrastructure but for the three 
plazas, so their treatment, management, and maintenance 
were up to individual building owners and tenants.
The third and last type of problems are related to design. As 
Wallace (2004) and other observers recognized, the Charles 
Center Plan suffers from the introverted lay-out, the lack of 
design coherence, the failure of the skywalk system, and the 
poor architectural solutions of many of the buildings. On this 
last problem, based on his professional experience, Wallace 
(2004) notes that no matter how good the urban design 
guidelines, you still need good architects to produce good 
design and a memorable place. Frieden & Sagalyn (1989: 42) 
were more negative noting that Charles Center’s superblocks 
structure was more appropriate to the suburbs, fitting 
poorly with the surrounding context and adding little to the 
attractiveness of the downtown.
However, the future and integrity of the Charles Center Plan may 
be at risk. As David Wallace (2004) pointed out in his memoirs, 
since Charles Center’s 40-year design and redevelopment 
controls expired in 1999 and the current downtown zoning 
ordinance allows a 14 FAR (floor area ratio), market pressures 
and developers’ proposals to intensify development may lead 
the city to drastic changes to the original concepts.
The early success and repercussions of Charles Center encour-
aged the City to follow the planners and the GBC’s recommen-
dation and expand revitalization efforts to another phase, fo-
cusing on the much larger area to the south known as Inner 
Harbor. Covering a 240-acre one-block deep area around the 
harbor’s edge, the Inner Harbor Project I Urban Renewal Plan 
was presented in 1964 and adopted by the city and the federal 
government as in 1967. The Inner Harbor plan was an almost 
instant success and, by creating a new, strong connection be-
tween Baltimore and its waterfront, it revealed untapped po-
tentials that generated economic, recreational impacts and 
ripple effects much larger than expected. 
Together, Charles Center and the Inner Harbor plans prove the 
importance of sustainable revitalization for Baltimore's livabil-
ity efforts. But the story of Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, and the 
conclusion for this two-part article, will have to wait until next 
year’s FOCUS. 
Note
The author thanks William Siembieda (Cal Poly), Ivor Samuels 
(Oxford), and Jay Brodie (president, Baltimore Development 
Corporation) for their helpful comments, as well as the support 
and images provided by Paul Dombrowski (director of planning 
and design, Baltimore Development Corporation).
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